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ALIENS AND CITIZENSHIPHoMOSEXUAL AcTivi'TY PRIOR
TO ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES HELD EVIDENCE OF "PSYCHO-
PATHIC PERSONALITY" SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT DEPORTA-
TION. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2nd
Cir. 1966).
Clive Michael Boutilier, a native and citizen of Canada, entered
the United States for permanent residence in 1955 at age twenty-one.
In 1963, having been gainfully employed and a continuous resident
of the United States since his entrance, he filed a petition for citizen-
ship. An affidavit accompanying the petition aroused the suspicions
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Boutilier was
requested to submit additional information, presumably about his
sexual history.1 In this later sworn statement, Boutilier readily ad-
mitted to several heterosexual experiences and to having been an
active homosexual since the age of sixteen.
Upon forwarding of the information by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to the Public Health Service, the latter con-
cluded that, in their opinion, Boutilier was a "psychopathic person-
ality, sexual deviate, at the time of his admission to the United
States for permanent residence. ..." In reliance upon Boutilier's
affidavits and armed with the statement issued by the Public Health
Service, the government commenced deportation proceedings under
section 212 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952.1 Boutilier declined the offer of an in personam examination
by Public Health Service doctors.' He was thereafter found by the
1 In the process of petitioning, Boutilier had signed an affidavit admitting to his
arrest in 1959, on a charge of sodomy, in violation of New York Penal Law § 690. The
charge was reduced to simple assault, and was eventually dismissed when the complain-
ing party failed to appear in court.
2 This opinion was in the form of a certificate signed by Paul H. Smith, M.D.,
Senior Surgeon, United States Public Health Service, Chief of Psychiatry, and Maria
Sarrigiannis, M.D., Medical Director, United States Public Health Service.
3 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (1952) [hereinafter cited as the
Act]. Section 212 (a) reads in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens
shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into
the United States:
(4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental
defect ....
4 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1952) ("[A] special inquiry officer
shall conduct proceedings . .. to determine the deportability of any alien .... .).
At the hearing Boutilier offered into evidence two letters from privately retained
psychiatrists. One letter was signed by Edward F. Falsey, M.D., and dated March 2,
1964. It stated in pertinent part:
[O]n psychiatric examination of Mr. Boutelier [sic], there was no indication
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special inquiry officer to have been a homosexual at the time of
entering the United States, thus excludable at that time as one
afflicted with a "psychopathic personality,"5 and therefore subject
to present deportation under section 241 (a) of the Act.0 Following
an unsuccessful appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals,7 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed: Boutilier was a
"psychopathic personality" within the meaning of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act, was within that class excludable from the
United States at entrance and therefore subject to present deportation.
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 363 F.2d 488
(2nd Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 927 (1966).
Section 212 (a) (4) of the Act prescribes the exclusion of certain
classes of aliens from entry into the United States. Section 241 (a)
of the Act' states: "Any alien in the United States . . . shall...
be deported who.., at the time of entry was within one or more
of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of
such entry. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Although Boutilier had been
in the United States for eight years, he could nevertheless be de-
deported if he failed to meet the requirements for entry into the
United States which were in effect in 1955 when he entered the
country.' The provision for "delayed exclusion," as used in Bou-
tilier, has been criticized as "an unnecessary as well as undesirable
of delusional trend or hallucinatory phenomena. He is not psychotic. From
his own account, he has a psychosexual problem but is beginning treatment
for this disorder. Diagnostically, I would consider him as having Character
Neurosis, believe that the prognosis in therapy is reasonably good and do not
think he represents any risk of decompensation into a dependent psychotic
reaction nor any potential for frank criminal activity.
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 363 F.2d 488, 491 n.6 (2d Cir.
1966). The second letter was in the form of a "Clinical Abstract" on the stationery
of Montague Ullman, M.D., under the date of March 30, 1965. In pertinent part it
stated:
[Boutilier's] sexual structure still appears fluid and immature so that he
moves from homosexual to heterosexual interest as well as abstinence with
almost equal facility. His homosexual orientation seems secondary to a very
constricted, dependent personality pattern rather than occurring in the con-
text of a psychopathic personality. My own feeling is that his own need to
fit in and be accepted is so great that it far surpasses his need for sex in any
form. 363 F.2d at 491 n.6.
6 The special inquiry officer noted that the phrase "psychopathic personality" as
used in section 212(a) (4) of the Act is a "legal term of art" rather than a "medical
formulation." 363 F.2d at 491; accord, Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1961) ; cf. United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956).
0 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1952).
7 C.F.R. 3.1(b) (1966) (decisions of special inquiry officers in deportation cases
appealable).
8 See statute cited note 6 supra.
9 See statute cited note 3 supra.
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feature of immigration policy."'1 Yet without the provision, a pre-
mium would be placed upon one's ability to deceive immigration
officials at the time of original entry into the country."
Is a homosexual a "psychopathic personality" per se? The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals had this to say about the phrase: "[T]o the
Congress it was intended to include homosexuals and sex per-
verts .... "12 In Boutilier, the Second Circuit also considered the
legislative intent surrounding section 212(a) (4) of the Act' and
reached a similar conclusion. Prior to the 1952 enactment the ex-
clusionary term used was "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" 14
instead of the present "psychopathic personality." In 1950, the
Senate Committe on the Judiciary, in the process of revising the
Act of 1917, recommended that "the classes of mental defectives
should be enlarged to include homosexuals and.other sex perverts."' 5
Several bills incorpoiating this recommendation were drafted, but
none were adopted.10 A report from the Public Health Service was
contained within the House Judiciary Committee report' 7 which ac-
companied H.R. 5678, the bill which ultimately became the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act of 1952. The Health Service report
contained recommendations for medical exclusion from the United
States, which the committee accepted with one exception not relevant
to this discussion. Homosexuals and other sex deviates were specifi-
cally included within the phrase "psychopathic personality," rather
than being given a separate category unto themselves. It would
seem, based on this legislative history, that Congress did specifically
intend to exclude homosexuals from entry into the United States by
including them under the general classification "psychopathic per-
sonality."'1
10 Comment, Limitations on Congressional Power to Deport Aliens Excludable as
Psychopaths at Time of Entry, 68 YALE L.J. 931, 948 (1959).
11 Comment, Development in the Law: Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARv. L.
REv. 643, 682 (1953).
12 Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1961).
:3 363 F.2d at 492 ([W]e believe the term ... reflects a Congressional purpose
to prevent alien homosexuals from obtaining admission into the country ....").
14 Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 875 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of
1917).
15 S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1950).
16 S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952); S. 2550, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 212(a) (1952) ; S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 212(a) (1951) ; S. 3455, 81st
ong., 2d Sess., § 212(a) (1950).
17 H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 46-48 (1952).
18 See Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 824 (1960); United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 412-13 n.2
(2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
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In attacking this legislative intent surrounding passage of section
212 (a) (4) of the Act, the Boutilier dissent quoted the Health Service
report to the House Judiciary Committee 19 and reached the conclu-
sion that Congress intended each fact situation to be determined on
its own merits. That is, each homosexual alien would receive an
individual determination by competent medical authority as to
whether he was a psychopathic personality.20
If the aforementioned intent of Congress to include homosexuals
within section 212 (a) (4) of the Act is not apparent to one who
reads the statute, is not the statute void for vagueness? There is the
legal fiction that everyone is presumed to know the law; however,
if the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is to be applied, the legislative
intent is of no consequence. Although the doctrine is usually ap-
plied in criminal cases,21 it is also relevant in considering legislation
that imposes civil sanctions.22 If "psychopathic personality" as used
in the Act is so vague as to camouflage the intent of Congress, it
would seem that a homosexual alien could not be excluded from
entry because he was unaware of his susceptibility to that exclusion.
The major difficulty in applying the "void-for-vagueness" doc-
trine to Boutilier is that section 212 (a) (4) of the Act is not pro-
hibitive; it does not attempt to prevent aliens from committing
homosexual acts. Rather, the purpose of the law is to exclude persons
having certain characteristics from becoming permanent residents
of the United States.23 If Boutilier was being deported for post-entry
behavior, then perhaps he could have recourse to the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine, for even the Public Health Service admitted that
the phrase was "vague and indefinite." 24 But it was Boutilier's pre-
entry behavior which was the cause of his deportation,25 despite the
fact that it was his post-entry behavior which first gave evidence of
19 H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong. 2d Sess., 4 (1952). "Psychopathic personalities"
are "disorders of the personality. . . characterized by developmental defects of patho-
logical trends in the personality structure manifested by lifelong patterns of . . . be-
havior .... " Those "psychopathic personalities" -who are "ill primarily in terms of
society and prevailing culture ... frequently include those . . . suffering from sexual
deviation."
20 363 F.2d at 499.
21 E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ("The underlying
principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he
could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.").
22 Jordon v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229-32 (1951); A. B. Small Co. v. Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
23 363 F.2d at 495.
24 H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 47 (1952).
25 363 F.2d at 495.
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his homosexuality. His freely-admitted homosexuality at the time of
entry is the cause of the deportation order.
2 6
Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 7 decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, held that "psychopathic personality" was vague, that
section 212 (a) (4) of the Act was void, and that an alien was not
to be deported because he was a homosexual at the time of entry into
the United States. The Fleuti court reasoned that most frequently the
strongest evidence by which a homosexual alien is discovered is
that alien's post-entry behavior. If the statute is vague and the alien
does not receive adequate warning that his post-entry homosexual
conduct may subject him to deportation, then his rights have been
prejudiced and section 212 (a) (4) is "void-for-vagueness." 28 Ap-
plying the Fleuti reasoning to the facts in Boutilier, we find the
reasoning of the two circuits at opposite poles. If "psychopathic
personality" were not vague, the possibility exists that Boutilier might
have refrained from his homosexual activities,29 and thereby avoided
his New York arrest and the subsequent investigation by Immigra-
tion officials.30 The Fleuti court felt that since the phrase "psycho-
pathic personality" was vague, the court could not look beyond the
wording of the Act to the legislative intent.31 Conceding that Con-
gress did intend to exclude homosexuals, the Fleuti court felt that
Congress had failed to articulate this intent in the Act. 2
26 The question of due process was raised by the dissent in Boutilier, primarily on
the grounds that Boutilier was labeled a psychopathic personality without an in-depth
medical and psychiatric examination. Section 234 of the Act directs that certification
of the physical and mental condition of arriving aliens must be made by Public Health
Service medical officers, and Boutilier received no such examination. In 1955, if
Boutilier was to have been excluded, he would have been entitled to such an examina-
tion. But under section 242(b) of the Act, covering deportation procedures, such an
examination is not necessary. 363 F.2d at 497. The dissent also quoted at length such
varied sources as Kinsey and the New York Tinres, and listed famous personages
who would have been excludable under the Act, including "Sappho, Leonardo da
Vind, Michelangelo, Andre Gide, and perhaps even Shakespeare. 363 F.2d at
497 and 499.
27 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449
(1963).
28 Id. at 656.
29 "The patient [Boutilier] has sexual interest in girls and has had intercourse with
them on a number of occasions . . . His sexual structure still appears fluid and im.
mature so that he moves from homosexual to heterosexual interests as well as absti-
nence with almost equal facility. His homosexual orientation seems secondary to a
very constricted, dependent personality pattern rather than occurring in the context
of a psychopathic personality." Clinical Abstract on the stationery of Montague Ullman,
M.D., of March 30, 1965; 363 F.2d at 498.
30 See material cited note 1 supra.
31 Accord, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); United States v.
Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 171 (1952).
32 302 F.2d at 658.
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In the light of the Fleuti decision, Congress amended section 212
(a) (4) of the Act38 to read:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided ...the following classes
of aliens shall be ... excluded from the United States:
"(4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual
deviation, or a mental defect ...... (Emphasis added.)
The Senate report which accompanied the Amendment makes it
very clear that Congress dimly viewed the Fleuti decision. 4
Although any homosexual who has entered the United States
since passage of the Amendment should have notice of his possible
exclusion or deportation,s Congress seems to have attempted to
eliminate confusion regarding the 1952 Act. However, the converse
appears to have resulted. An alien reading the 1952 Act in light of
the 1965 Amendment could assume that sexual deviates were not
excludable until 1965 since "psychopathic personality" is in both
statutes and "sexual deviation" is used in the Amendment only.
Rather than clarifying its original intention, Congress has made it
more obscure.36 It is submitted that if the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine applies to section 212 (a) (4) of the Act, the term "psycho-
pathic personality" is vague and ambiguous on its face; consequently
the section would be void. It is further submitted that Congress did
intend to exclude homosexuals as a group from admission to the
United States in the Act of 1952, but expressed this intention poorly.
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits admit to these facts, yet differ
in the application of the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine.
The behavior against which Congress attempted to legislate repels
the ordinary person. Homosexuals live on the perimeter of society,
83 79 Stat. 919 (1965), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. I, 1966) (hereinafter referred to
as the Amendment).
4 S. REp. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 (1965).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on April 17, 1962, set
aside a deportation order and enjoined its enforcement holding that section
212(a) (4) (of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952) was un-
constitutionally vague in that homosexuality was not sufficiently encompassed
within the term "psychopathic personality." . ..
To resolve any doubt, the committee specifically included the term "sexual
deviation" as a ground of exclusion in this bill.
85 See statute cited note 33 supra.
86 This observation is borne out in a 1966 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Lavoie v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 360 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1966), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3081 (U.S. Sept. 13, 1966) (No. 513), a per
curiam opinion in total agreement with Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1962).
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in a shadowed segment of which few persons know. Kinsey estimated
that persons with Boutilier's sexual habits comprise somwhere be-
tween four and eight per cent of American males, and that some
thirty-seven per cent of American men have had at least one homo-
sexual experience.3 7 In reality, homosexuals as a group are neither
particularly dangerous38 nor are they easily definable.a9
The rationale for banning homosexual aliens from our shores
seems subject to some question: Is behavior which is contrary to the
norm, even disgusting to most of the populace, justifiable grounds
for exclusion from the United States? The United States should
not become a haven for persons afflicted with various kinds of sexual
deviations-no such suggestion is made. The Act specifically ex-
cluded persons with epilepsy,40 but advanced medical knowledge and
a more sophisticated approach to immigration policies have elim-
inated this term from the Amendment. 41 As the knowledge of psy-
chosexual behavior develops and such behavior becomes more un-
derstandable, Congress may see that the general classification of
sexual deviates may include a number of persons who can be an
asset to this country rather than a liability. It is submitted that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service be given the latitude of
making individual determinations as to whether an applicant for
citizenship has a record of past behavior or a particular trait which
will prevent him from becoming a useful member of a democratic
society.
JOHN F. BROCK
37 KINSEY, Po!ERoy, and MAtirN, S.ExuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUmAN MALE, 623
(1948).
38 COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 369 (2d ed. 1956)
("[Those who are predominantly homosexual . .. apparently manifest no other
evidences of serious personality deviation than we would expect to find in a comparable
group of heterosexuals.").
39 Finger, Sex Beliefs and Practices Among Male College Students, JOURNAL OF
ABNoRmAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1947).
rUt is not possible to divide people into two clear-cut groups-homosexuals
and heterosexuals. Rather these terms represent the extreme poles of a con-
tinuum, and in between we find many individuals whose experiences and
psychic reactions combines both heterosexual and homosexual components
40 See statute cited note 3 supra.
41 See statute cited note 33 supra.
